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The article revives a theoretical denition of party coherence as being composed of two
basic elements, cohesion and factionalism, to propose and apply a novel empirical mea-
sure based on spin physics. The simultaneous analysis of both components using a single
measurement concept is applied to data representing the political beliefs of candidates
in the Swiss general elections of 2003 and 2007, proposing a connection between the
coherence of the beliefs party members hold and the assessment of parties being at
risk of splitting. We also compare our measure with established polarization measures
and demonstrate its advantage with respect to multidimensional data that lack clear
structure. Furthermore, we outline how our analysis supports the distinction between
bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of party splitting. In this way, we are able to turn
the intuition of coherence into a dened quantitative concept that, additionally, oers
a methodological basis for comparative research of party coherence. Our work serves as
an example of how a complex systems approach allows to get a new perspective on a
long-standing issue in political science.
Keywords: Measurement Methods; Party Coherence; Polarization; Political Science; Su-
perparamagnetic Clustering
1. Introduction: Toward a New Intuition of Party Coherence
Parties are non-unitary entities [15, 35, 41, 42]. They only \behave `as if' they were
unitary actors when they have to, in situations where undisciplined behavior will
1
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impose high collective costs" ([47]: p. 281). However, aside from such `imperative'
moments, daily intra-party politics involves internal struggles over policies, strate-
gies, or oces [15, 40, 43]. Thus, the emergence of factions, wings, and sub-groups is
a fact of life in most party organizations [28, 24], as it is a manifestation of internal
diversity [19]. Party organizations constitute \collections of individuals or coalitions
of sub-party groups with common but also divergent preferences and interests and
with competing claims on party resources" ([5]: p. 56) rather than monolithic units.
Thus, parties dier with respect to party coherence, which Janda dened as the
\degree of congruence in the attitudes and behavior of party members" ([33]: p.
118) and involves two elements: cohesion and factionalism [34].
Understanding the kind and degree of coherence within a party organization is
important for comparing political parties and characterizing the dynamics of party
change, which itself contributes to political change within a society. In this paper,
we provide a new coherence measure in order to capture important dimensions
of party structure using one single measurement concept. Our concept does not
involve a new model for party dynamics; rather, it provides a tool to describe party
coherence based, e.g., on survey data of beliefs party members hold on political
issues. As we outline in section 2, our measure has a broad spectrum of applications;
the current contribution provides an example of how a complex systems approach
allows getting a new perspective on long-standing issues in social sciences.
We consider party politics and, in particular, the Swiss party system a fruitful
topic for applying our measure of coherence due to three reasons: First, although
considerable theoretical work on party dynamics has been published (e.g. [23]) and
recent research has shown novel insights with respect to diversity within parties, the
literature is underdeveloped in terms of quantitative eorts. Second, while various
measures for capturing the organizational structure of parties exist, they usually
grasp only one dimension of this complex phenomenon. Third, Switzerland recently
experienced two party splits and one party merger in the last decade that makes
this country an ideal test-case for our measure.
With respect to the rst motivation for our paper, an interesting change in the
literature on party dynamics is observable. Contrary to the prevalent view that
internally fragmented parties are alien to the parliamentary regime type because
they send mixed signals to their voters about the policies they pursue, prove to be
less eective in parliament, and are doubtful partners in government coalitions [7,
8, 40, 42], recent research has shown that factions take up dierent and positive
functions for parties. This, however, depends on the \kind" of factionalism. Boucek
[6] recognizes three forms (\faces") { cooperative, competitive, and degenerative
factionalism { of which only the latter produces exclusively negative eects and
outcomes for the party organization (collapses or splits). In contrast, cooperative
factionalism has a consensus-building function and preserves sub-group identities,
particularly in heterogeneous umbrella parties. The aim is internal consolidation
and integration to avoid open conicts that would increase the risk of a break-up.
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Competitive factionalism manages existing intra-party conicts through diusion
strategies. The factions are opposed to each other, but the party provides for the
institutional mechanisms (intra-party democracy, balance of power) to channel in-
ternal rivalries. Internal competition can be benecial since it activates the rank and
le and broadens the choice for the electorate. Still, it is a balancing act for a party
since, \[w]ithout adequate safeguards, factional competition can become excessive.
Hence, to keep factional pressures under control, leaders need to be vigilant to this
risk (...)" ([6]: p. 476).
Boucek's functional perspective on factionalism followed a criticism by Belloni
and Beller [2] that investigations of the issue had engaged mainly in the development
of classication schemes for dierent types of factions (e.g., by [19, 28, 33, 58] that
fail to account for factional dynamics and their consequences for the overarching
organization (see also [6]: p. 468). On the conceptual level, Boucek's contribution
marks an important step forward. However, the study of factionalism (still) suers
from an underdeveloped methodological level that complements the theoretical con-
cepts with empirical measures. To do justice to the advanced state of the theoretical
debate, the challenge is to nd a measure that not only takes into account the num-
ber and size of party sub-groups but also considers the cohesion of the overall party
as well as the cohesion within and between these sub-groups. As we rely on Janda's
considerations on the topic, we also stick to his simple denition of cohesion \as the
extent to which parties vote together" ([34]: p. 174), which basically relies on the
general intuition of `cohesion' used in many disciplines (physics, chemistry, social
psychology etc.) referring to any kind of force/similarity that holds entities of a
system together. But unlike Janda, and many other authors, the terminology we
use is not conned to legislative voting, but refers to all kinds of explicated political
beliefs, expressed e.g. in an opinion poll.a This calls for an integrated measure of
party coherence, which is composed of the two elements intuitively suggested by
Janda: cohesion and factionalism [33, 34].
This observation leads to the second motivation for our contribution { the lack
of an integrative measure of party coherence. Certainly, various single indices exist
such as the eective number of factions [5], derived from the famous eective number
of parties developed by Taagepera and Shugart [64], or widely-used legislative party
unity measures such as the Rice index and its modied versions [1, 9, 16, 29, 56],
which basically measure the extent to which a parliamentary party group votes in
unison. Alternative analytical methods visualize intra-party heterogeneity on one or
more ideological dimensions and interpret the distances between the estimated ideal
points as a measure for ideological dissimilarity (e.g. [13, 26, 54, 55]). Finally, also
the polarization research literature provides various potential measures to capture
aSee further below for our mathematical denitions. Throughout this article we try to keep termi-
nological questions as simple as possible. Moreover, we are fully aware that the literature further
distinguishes between `party unity' (as the most generic term), inherent `cohesiveness', and en-
forced `discipline' (see [7, 9, 25, 53]. We do not make this distinction here but simply assume that
the survey data we analyze is a manifestation of party cohesion.
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party coherence, e.g. the dispersion of opinions measured by its variance, the degree
of bimodality of the opinion distribution measured by its kurtosis, or the more
elaborated Esteban-Ray polarization measure and its derivatives [17, 18, 20] that
combine cohesion within and divergence between subgroups and are thus the most
promising candidates for measuring party coherence.
While all these measures { single indices, spatial approaches, and polarization
measures { prove to be adequate for the needs of legislative or party-system experts
who are interested in the number and size of factions, the extent of party unity
and ideological heterogeneity, or polarization between parties, they are insucient
for research on intra-party factionalism. This is immediately obvious in the case of
Boucek's own index of the eective number of factions since this index does not
provide any useful information about the dynamics between the factions (e.g. the
three forms of factionalism proposed by Ref. [6]). Party unity indices are prob-
lematic, too, mainly because the average unity score does not tell much about the
internal factional structure of a party. For instance, a Rice index value of 90.0 might
indicate either that the party is highly united and the remaining ve percent of the
members of parliament (MPs) who, on average, vote against the party line is, in
itself, a heterogeneous group, or that the dissenting ve percent are on the verge of
defection.b Moreover, analyses based on legislative votes in parliamentary systems
usually overestimate party unity because of peer pressure and disciplinary measures
[7, 25] and, thus, are generally bad predictors of party splits.c Finally, polarization
measures have been developed mainly to capture instabilities on the societal level,
referring, e.g., to larger intra-party distances along the political left-right axis (e.g.
[49]). Although some measures may be suitable to capture the smaller opinion di-
vergence within a single party, we will show in this contribution (section 4.2.4.)
that they fail to sketch an adequate picture of intra-party polarization, because not
necessarily the heterogeneous parties are in higher risk of splitting.
Finally, the third motivation for our paper refers to a remarkable development in
Swiss politics that makes this country an ideal test case for our measure: Although
party mergers and splits are extreme and thus rare outcomes of party dynamics,
especially in long-established, stable democracies, Switzerland has witnessed two
party splits and one party merger within the last decade. This underlines the fact
that, in the last 15 years, the Swiss multi-party systemd has undergone major
transitions [37, 45]. The rst major development concerned regrouping within the
bourgeois party camp. The formerly cohesive and dominant bourgeois camp, con-
sisting of the CVP (moderate Christian-democrats), the FDP (liberal Free Demo-
bIllustrative is the case of the German Social-democrats (SPD), often regarded as the most dis-
ciplined legislative party in the German parliament with Rice index scores of almost 100.0 [59].
The SPD still went through a severe internal crisis and eventually suered a party split at the
grassroots level in 2004.
cFurthermore, the analysis of legislative votes is aected by data validity problems, especially in
comparative settings [9, 10, 30, 52, 57].
dBetween 2003 and 2012 there have always been 12-14 parties represented in Swiss parliament.
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cratic Party), the SVP (national-conservative Swiss People's Party), and the small
Liberal Party (which merged with the FDP in 2008), was blown up by the SVP's
strong accentuation of national-conservative standpoints, mainly regarding foreign
and immigration policy. The party system, thus, developed into a triple-pole sys-
tem of roughly a 30% vote share each: left-wing parties { mainly the SPS (Social-
democrats) and GPS (Green Party) {, right-wing parties (mainly the SVP), and a
conglomerate of moderate-center parties (such as the CVP and FDP) [46]. In this
system, the ideologically heterogeneous and also increasingly competitive political
center regularly plays the role of legislative majority-builders by deciding whether
they ally with the parties on the right or on the left [32, 36, 61].e Within this change
that can be described as a between-party-polarization, two party splits constitute a
major development. In 2004, shortly after the 2003 general elections, center-turned
members of the GPS seceded and founded the Green-Liberal Party (GLP) as a new
political force positioned somewhere between the GPS and the CVP. Similarly, and
as a direct consequence of the aforementioned rst major development in the Swiss
party system, some moderate members of the SVP separated in 2008 and formed
the Bourgeois-Democratic Party (BDP), which now poaches in the preserves of the
FDP and the CVP. In the same period, the FDP made a move in the opposite
direction since the party merged with the LPS. To sum up, two parties suered a
split and one party has merged with a smaller one. Only the SPS and the CVP
came through without internal splits or mergers.
Political observers see a distinct quality in the two party splits. While the se-
cession of the Green-Liberals seems to be traced back to marked dierences in
ideological attitudes at the grass-roots level regarding the role of the state in envi-
ronmental, economic, and welfare issuesf [63], the SVP-BDP split seems more to be a
consequence of widening discrepancies among party elites with respect to questions
of political conduct (gentle vs. oensive conservatism) rather than of deep-rooted
ideological disagreement [38]. Thus, the Green Party split may be characterized as
a `bottom-up' split, while the SVP split is more `top-down'. This distinction refers
to the localization of the driving forces within a party's organization that may lead
to a split { i.e. either more on the level of `ordinary' party members or even party
sympathizers or more on the level of leading party gures, the party elite. However,
this distinction is not disjunctive, as both mechanisms can be in play, although one
of both could be predominant. Thus, the question emerges of how one could nd a
way to identify clear markers of either type of party split mechanism. We propose,
that our measure of coherence would allow clarifying this distinction.
Summing up: To catch up with recent theoretical contributions in the eld, to
overcome longstanding shortcomings of existing measurement techniques, and to
eThere is no stable parliamentary majority in the Swiss legislature, but ad hoc coalitions that
form during a lawmaking process according to policy preferences at stake [36, 62, 61].
fThe GPS stands on the ground of a leftist, trade union-oriented ideology, while the GLP is based
on moderate liberalism.
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get insight into very recent and dramatic changes within Swiss parties, this paper
proposes a new measure of party coherence based on Janda's [33, 34] considerations
which intuitively brought together the idea of cohesion and factionalism, but did
not oer an integrated measure for it. The paper further provides for an empirical
application of the measure in terms of a plausibility check for the results and oers
some possible interpretations.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next two sections introduce and operational-
ize the measure of party coherence based on the superparamagnetic clustering pro-
cedure and link it to the theoretical concepts of party factionalism and party coher-
ence cited above (the mathematical details of the clustering algorithm are outlined
in the appendix). Afterwards, we will test this concept using survey data regarding
the political positions of candidates in the run-up to the Swiss general elections of
2003 and 2007 (which avoids the aforementioned pitfalls of measuring based on leg-
islative votes). We also check whether alternative measures deriving, in particular,
from the polarization literature, are able to detect indications for party splits in the
SVP and GPS. In the last section, the paper briey discusses the results in light
of recent developments in the Swiss party system, species some shortcomings and
pitfalls of our approach, and assesses the potentials for future research.
2. Physics Meets Politics: Superparamagnetic Clustering as a
Measurement of Party Coherence
In order to turn Janda's [33, 34] considerations of party coherence consisting of two
dimensions into a dened quantitative concept the paper suggests the adaption of
the concept of superparamagnetic clustering [4, 50] to analyze the internal organi-
zation of parties. Superparamagnetic clustering is a nonparametric method suitable
for detecting and characterizing group structures in data without imposing a prior
bias. The algorithm is inspired by a self-organization phenomenon in magnetic spin
systems. In an inhomogeneous spin system, clusters of correlated spins can emerge,
corresponding to groups of spins with strong couplings (i.e. strong interactions).
Upon an increase in temperature, i.e. an increase in stress on the system, these
clusters decay into smaller units in a cascade of (pseudo-)phase transitions, reveal-
ing the richness of the cluster structure of the system. Hence, the physical properties
(`coherence') of the spin system are contingent on two factors: 1. stability of the
largest cluster (the core cluster) under stress (the cohesion dimension); 2. diversity
of the whole system in terms of cluster diversity (the factionalism dimension).
A translation of this picture into the world of political science yields the following
correspondent: the spin system is the party organization, the single spins are the
party members (i.e. their belief systemsg, if the coherence of the party is assessed
under the perspective of the beliefs the party member holds), the spin couplings
gFollowing Converse, a belief system is a \conguration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements
are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" ([14]: p. 207).
December 31, 2012 14:12 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
ChristenOttSchwarz_Coherence_ACS
Paper's Title 7
reect the similarity of their belief systems, and the temperature may be interpreted
as an external stress factor (e.g., electoral decline)h that imposes more weight on
disagreement among party members with respect to political issues (by, e.g., forcing
them out of a party). The couplings are related to the distance matrix that reects
the mutual similarity between each pair of members. Hence the similarity matrix
encodes the party structure and stability. The largest cluster represents the main
core of a party. Its stability corresponds to the party cohesion (note that according
to our notion, the term `cohesion' reects a stability property of the core cluster,
whereas in a broader understanding in political science, cohesion is an analogue
of the similarity { in beliefs, voting behavior, etc. { of the party members). The
revealed cluster structure reects the structure of internal factions (or sub-groups)
of a party according to systematic dierences in some political issues. This structure
is captured by the notion of factionalism.
At this point, it is important to recall the purpose of resorting to physics: we use
the spin model to introduce a measurement for the coherence of political beliefs. It
is an analytical instrument, and, as such, it is neither intended to describe nor to
explain the behavioral dynamics of party splits. Our measure claims only that it
catches the state of the internal coherence of parties in two important dimensions as
a mere prerequisite (and not a causal explanation) for a possible split. Thus, since we
are neither modeling the split itself nor the forces which might lead to the split, we do
not require to provide an exact correspondence between the parameters of the self-
organization phenomenon (e.g., temperature), and the real social forces at work in
a political party. In fact, superparamagnetic clustering has been applied for cluster
analyses in many dierent elds (an overview is given in [50] and references therein)
and can be described as a data analysis method without reference to spins. From
this formal standpoint, the parameter T , interpreted as the system's temperature, is
a resolution parameter that controls the granularity of the cluster detection process.
However, the spin picture oers a convenient framework of conception.
Furthermore, the basic concept of the measure is in principle not dependent on
the specic similarity metrics used. As we relate party coherence to the belief system
of the party, we have chosen a similarity metrics that quanties the disagreements
of party members in respect of political issues. However, one may also analyze party
coherence from a dierent perspective, e.g. by focusing on actual social interactions
party members have and quantify this aspect. The problem under investigation and
the theory behind the problem leads the choice of the similarity relation and makes
the measure adaptable to dierent types of problems (see [12]).
With this two-dimensional quantication at hand we are able to establish an em-
pirical link to what we have previously identied the core implication from Boucek's
[6] theoretical work: high degrees of party factionalism do not necessarily mean high
risks of party splits. Some parties are stable organizations even if (or because) they
hHarmel and Janda [23] consider external stimuli as very important factors contributing to party
change.
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Fig. 1. Four ideal types of party coherence (the overlapping clusters indicate that these categories
are not strictly dened and quantied).
are highly factionalized. Pivotal is instead the combination of the two dimensions,
factionalism and cohesion. Translated into our own quantitative concept of party
coherence, which is composed of two numeric values, we can identify four exemplary
states of a party (Fig. 1): (1) low degrees of cohesion and factionalism: The members
of such a party are only loosely associated and do not form cohesive sub-groups. The
party constantly runs a risk of losing individual members as soon as stress increases
(`opportunists') but, due to the fragmented internal structure, there is no reason
to fear that an organized rebellion of any strong sub-group will cause a major split
in the party. (2) High degrees of factionalism, low degrees of cohesion: the party
exhibits a high plurality of sub-groups and lacks a strong and stable core (`plurality
zone'). However, the couplings between the sub-groups are not signicantly smaller
than those within the sub-groups, diminishing the risk of splitting due to a high
degree of factionalism. (3) Low degrees of factionalism and high degrees of cohesion
may indicate a highly united party. All members are concentrated around a strong
core (`unity zone'). (4) For any party, the most disquieting state is the combination
of high degrees of factionalism and cohesion. The structure of the members' belief
systems makes the party potentially vulnerable to a split, as two ore more strong
sub-groups exist with strong couplings within the groups but low couplings between
them (`schism zone').
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3. Coherence: Exposition of the Measure and Operationalization
Our measure of coherence is based on superparamagnetic clustering (SPC, [4]) and
sequential superparamagnetic clustering (SSC, [50]) { two algorithms whose techni-
cal details are outlined in the appendix. Based on these algorithms, we have dened
a measure of coherence that captures both cohesion and factionalism of a party [11].
The cohesion component of the whole party Cc is calculated in the SPC framework.
It is evaluated with respect to the disintegration of the largest cluster c for increas-
ing temperature T until the system's order completely breaks apart, where T is the
parameter that models the stress on the system. This involves the assumption that
the largest cluster represents the 'core' of the party that disintegrates under stress.
Let CS(t) be the size of the core cluster for T = t. We assume that CS(0) = n,
where n stands for the total number of data points (i.e., all the party members);
i.e., without stress, all the members are in the same cluster. Upon an increase in
stress, CS(t) decreases until CS(t) = 1 for some t = Tend. The average decay curve
serves as a measure of party cohesion.
Cc =
1
Tend
Z Tend
0
CS(t)
n
dt (1)
The measure is normalized to the interval [0,1].i Cc is close to 1 if the largest
cluster remains intact for a long time and then disintegrates rapidly for high T ,
whereas Cc is close to 0 if the largest cluster disintegrates rapidly and only a small
core is stable over a longer interval. In the actual analysis, Cc is calculated in l+ 1
discrete steps t = 0;T; 2T; :::; Tend = lT . For the approximate calculation of
the integral, the trapezoidal rule, known from basic calculus, is used.
Cc =
l 1X
i=0
(CS(iT ) + CS((i+ 1)T )
2nl
(2)
The factionalism component of coherence Cf is calculated using SSC, yielding
a binary tree in which the size of each of the k sub-clusters is evaluated. Again,
we consider the largest cluster c as the `core' of the system. Cf is calculated as the
sum of the distance of each cluster ci from the largest cluster in the tree diagram
weighted with its size jcij. The `tree distance' di is the number of bifurcation points
in the tree between c and ci. Both the maximal tree distance dmax and the size of
the largest cluster serve as calibration factors, leading to the denition:
Cf =
kX
i=1
di
dmax
 jcijjcj (3)
iIntegration and normalization ensure comparability by rendering the measure independent of T .
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Cf is not normalized to 1 according to the current denition. Its value is 0 if SSC
does not reveal any sub-clusters, and it is close to 0 if only small clusters emerge.
However, many large clusters that have a large tree distance from the largest cluster
lead to an increase in Cf . Since Cf is typically far below the maximally possible
value, the normalization was skipped to simplify the calculation.
In this way, the measure consisting of the two components Cc and Cf is able
to capture the intuition of coherence outlined in Figure 1. It is important to recall
the interrelation between these two dimensions: The distance matrix encodes the
similarity between all party members and in this way reects both the cohesion
of the whole party (measured by Cc) as well as the cohesion within and between
sub-groups { latter is then expressed by the cluster tree that emerges in the SSC
paradigm. The concept was tested extensively and approved on the basis of toy data
[11]. We now apply the measure using data that approximates the political beliefs
of members of Swiss parties.
4. An Application to the Swiss Party System
The aim of the following section is to provide a plausibility check for the results
of the new measure. The benchmark we use is the (scarce) literature and political
commentary on recent development in the Swiss party system. We are not testing
for alternative explanations since we are not establishing a causal model that could
fully explain the occurrence of party splits.
4.1. Data, Political Context, and Hypothetical Expectations
Our data originate from the smartvote project, a Swiss vote advice application [66].j
As a part of the project, all political candidates in the run-up to the Swiss general
elections in 2003 and 2007 were invited to take part in a survey of about 70 questions
designed to elicit the candidates' political positions on a broad range of issues.k For
our project, we investigated the candidates of the ve largest Swiss parties: the SVP
(national-conservative Swiss People's Party), SPS (Social-democrats), FDP (liberal
Free Democratic Party), CVP (Christian-democrats), and GPS (Green Party). The
response rate was higher in 2007 (between 82-98% of all candidates of the ve parties
answered the questionnaire) than in 2003 (46-78%), which points to the increasing
relevance of the project since its launch (see Table 1).l The questionnaire items were
jSmartvote (http://www.smartvote.ch) is a widely used web-based vote advice application in
Switzerland which has been developed and is operated by the non-partisan, non-prot associa-
tion `Politools' in Berne. It is based on the idea of preference matching; i.e., any smartvote user
(voter) may answer the same set of questions as the candidates and then gets a list of candidates
that indicates the political distance between the user and the candidates.
kThe survey comprised 70 questions in 2003 and 73 in 2007. In 2003, the smartvote tool was
operational only in the German- and French-speaking parts of the country. It was extended to the
Italian-speaking part in 2007.
lThe use of candidate survey data that are made public in the run-up to elections may raise
methodological concerns in two respects: rst is data validity since the responses might be en-
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Table 1. Response rate to the smartvote questionnaire by (elected) candidates,
2003 and 2007: Number of candidates/elected MPs for which smartvote data was
available, and percentage of total number of candidates/elected MPs.
2003 2007
all candidates elected candidates all candidates elected candidates
CVP 223 (67.6%) 30 (69.8%) 327 (85.8%) 39 (84.8%)
FDP 308 (70.2%) 28 (56.0%) 459 (91.8%) 38 (88.4%)
GPS 140 (51.1%) 11 (84.6%) 372 (87.3%) 21 (95.5%)
SPS 286 (77.9%) 54 (88.5%) 404 (96.0%) 48 (92.3%)
SVP 184 (46.5%) 34 (54.0%) 343 (81.7%) 57 (82.6%)
answered using a 4-point-Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly
disagree), leading to the following distance function between two candidates X and
Y of the same party with respect to this item: the possible answers are coded with
1 to 4. If both agreed to a question, the resulting value is 0, whereas the maximal
value is 3 (strongly agree vs. strongly disagree, j1  4j)m. The sum of the absolute
values for each question normalized with the number of answered questions is the
distance between X and Y (Manhattan distance metric)n. The mutual comparison
among all candidates of a party both in 2003 and 2007 results in a distance matrix
that serves as input for the clustering algorithms.
This approach weighted each issue captured by the smartvote survey equally
based on the rational that the items had been chosen to capture the most important
issues present in the political discussion to which each party had distinct opinions. It
could be the case that disagreements upon some issues may be of more importance
for a specic party than disagreements upon other issues; this can be incorporated
by putting more weight on these components in our distance function. However, this
would have required an independent survey of the smartvote items with respect to
party-specic relevance, which is beyond the scope of our plausibility analysis.
The smartvote project collects data at the level of individual candidates, which
seems appropriate for several reasons: First, Swiss parties are organized along
Switzerland's federalistic structure; i.e., they constitute bottom-up organizations
dogenous to party aliations or voter preferences (see, e.g., [22]), and second is the completeness
of the data (coverage of all relevant party sub-groups). While most survey data are prone to such
problems, previous research with smartvote data may alleviate at least some of these concerns.
E.g., Ref. [61] shows that, on average, 85% of the answers given by elected MPs in the pre-election
survey correspond to their real legislative behavior. Moreover, the main reason that MPs deviate
from their pre-election positions is incompatibility with the position of their legislative party group.
Thus, endogeneity problems do not seem particularly worrying. Likewise, various inspections of
the 2003 and 2007 data have shown that, of the ve parties included in our analysis, all relevant
sub-groups (party wings) are suciently covered.
mThe 2007 survey contained ten questions related to public spending in various policy elds. These
questions have only three answer options (more spending, as-is state, less spending); the maximum
distance per question in these cases is 2.
nSeveral distance metrics have been investigated. The Manhattan distance proved to be the sim-
plest measure that revealed the most stable results.
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on the basis of local and cantonal parties [37] that are solely and exhaustively re-
sponsible for the nomination of candidates within their district. This fragmented
structure cultivates regional disparities within the parties. Second, the voting sys-
tem for the National Council follows open-list proportional representation in 20
of the 26 electoral districts (the remaining six are single-member districts that
apply a rst-past-the-post system). Voters are allowed to split their votes freely
between candidates of dierent party lists; approximately 60% of the ballots cast
are modied [44]. Third, Swiss legislators enjoy a considerable amount of political
leeway since the executive-legislative relations follow, to a large extent, the logic
of a separation-of-powers system [27, 39, 61, 62]. This, altogether, promotes the
cultivation of personal, party-independent candidate proles.
As outlined in the introduction, both the SVP and the GPS experienced a
party split in the last decade, although political observers see a distinct quality
in the two splits. This presumable distinct quality of the two party splits leads to
the expectation that coherence between the belief systems among the pre-split SVP
members is generally higher than that among pre-split GPS members. Furthermore,
we expect a dierence when we restrict the coherence analysis to the elected MPs as
representatives of the 'true' party elite. There, we expect greater agreement among
the GPS elites than among the SVP elites before the splits.
4.2. Results of the Coherence Analysis
4.2.1. Sensitivity analysis
Compared to other types of classication problems [51], our data sets did not display
denite structure in terms of clear-cut, distinguishable sub-groups. Thus, a sensitiv-
ity analysis was necessary to assess the parameter space spanned by the calibration
parameters of the clustering algorithm (these parameters allow for controlling the
clustering sensitivity; see the appendix for details). The sensitivity analysis revealed
a parameter (NT steps, a number that controls the resolution of the T -axis into
steps T ) that is suited to characterize the statistical properties of the coherence
measure, as a variation led to quasi-stable intervals (with respect to non-zero values
of Cf ) in the parameter space for each data set. Based on samples of parameter val-
ues from these intervals, Cc and Cf have been calculated for each party, leading to
statistics for which the mean and standard deviation are displayed. The variability
of Cf was, in all cases, larger than the variability of Cc (see standard deviations in
Fig. 2). A direct comparison of all the parties under equal parameter settings for
the algorithm is possible for, e.g., NT steps = 220 since this value was located in
all the quasi-stable intervals.
4.2.2. Overall party coherence
The coherence analysis (Fig. 2) comparing the parties for the 2003 and 2007 elections
conrms that the Swiss party system is formed by mostly non-coherent parties:
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While the unity zone was already virtually unoccupied in 2003, there is an increasing
tendency in 2007 for further crowding in the opportunism zone.
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Fig. 2. Coherence analysis for Swiss parties based on the candidates of national elections 2003 and
2007.
However, the comparison between the 2003 and 2007 elections reveals some
interesting developments with regard to the focus cases of the analysis, the GPS,
SVP and FDP: rst, the largest change in terms of cohesion and factionalism can
be observed within the GPS. In 2003, the party was located around the schism zone
but left it for the opportunism zone in 2007, mainly due to a distinct reduction in
the factionalism dimension of the coherence measure. Second, the candidates of the
SVP tended in 2003 toward the plurality zone; i.e., the party was characterized by
a collection of identiable subgroups which exhibited suciently strong between-
group couplings to avoid the risk of a split. The number and strength of these sub-
groups decreased until 2007. Consequently, the SVP moved into the opportunism
zone, quite close to the border area of the unity zone. Third, the most 'monolithic'
party was the FDP in 2003, which, however, lost this property in 2007. In our
analysis for 2007, we anticipated the merger between the FDP and LPS and tied
the candidates of the two parties together since it was already clear back then
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that they would combine forces in the very near future. Other than what could
be intuitively concluded from the analysis, the merger is not responsible for the
decrease in cohesion because the move to the left in Figure 2 also appears when we
calculate the coherence of FDP candidates alone; it is the factionalism dimension
that was mainly increased by the merger. Fourth, the SPS dived deeper into the
opportunism zone between 2003 and 2007, while, with the CVP, hardly any changes
can be observed; this party kept a stable position deep in the opportunism zone.
In the face of the splits and mergers that have occurred within the GPS, SVP,
and FDP, the results in Figure 2 are not unexpected and will be further scrutinized
below with regard to dierences between the coherence of the belief systems among
all candidates (rank and le) and the coherence within the selection of elected MPs
(top elite of the party).o Two outcomes of the coherence analysis are particularly
surprising for scholars of the Swiss party system: the high coherence among FDP
members in 2003 and the quite incoherent state of the SPS at both measuring points.
In the latter case, the popular picture of a highly united legislative party obviously
does not match the true heterogeneity of the party members' belief systems.
4.2.3. Comparing candidates with elected MPs
In the second step, we compared Cc and Cf of the parties with the corresponding
values of the elected MPs of each party.p In this way, we can investigate the extent
to which the coherence of the elected MPs (representing the `elite' of each party)
reects the coherence in the eld of all candidates (representing the rank and le).
We restrict our analytical focus here to the three cases that have undergone splits or
mergers since 2003 (the GPS, SVP, and FDP). Figure 3 reveals three very dierent
patterns. First, in both 2003 and 2007, the SVP elite was closer to the schism zone
than the party's rank and le, which conrms the characterization of a `top-down'
split of the party in 2008. In contrast, the coherence analysis of all SVP candidates
would not have led to the conclusion that a party split was imminent. Second, the
analysis of the Green Party depicts a marked dierence from the other parties.
The GPS elite in 2003 is clearly located in the unity zone, while the coherence
analysis of the party's rank and le signals an imminent party split at the grass-
roots level (which, indeed, materialized in 2004). The ideological diversity among
oIn our analysis, elected MPs form the `top' of the party while the mass of all running candi-
dates forms the `bottom'. This seems reasonable in the Swiss context due to the aforementioned
fragmented intra-party structures and the fact that Swiss parties, compared to their foreign coun-
terparts, cultivate a more inclusive, less hierarchical organizational structure even at the national
level.
pFor Cc, we investigated the values of temperature T at which the elected candidates `left' the
main cluster for increasing T , leading to a value of Cc for the elected candidates in relation to the
decay behavior of all party members. For Cf , we took the binary tree of the whole party as the
structure of the network and determined where in the network the elected candidates are located,
leading to a value of Cf for the elected candidates in relation to the network structure of the whole
party.
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party members obviously had no equivalent representation in the party elite. In
2007, after the party split, the situation completely reversed. Now, the party elite
(which also increased from 13 MPs in 2003 to 22 in 2007) is much closer to the
schism zone, while another `bottom-up' split coming from the rank and le seems
unlikely. Finally, regarding the FDP, the party elite both in 2003 and 2007 was closer
located to the unity zone than the rank and le. The 2007 gures, which comprise
the combined data for FDP and LPS candidates, further conrm the higher internal
diversity produced by the merger.
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Fig. 3. Coherence analysis for Swiss parties' candidates and elected MPs for FDP, GPS and SVP.
The dierences between GPS and SVP regarding the coherence of all party can-
didates versus their elites are analyzed in more detail by referring to the network
(Fig. 4). The aim is to see whether we nd additional evidence for the qualita-
tively distinct party splits of GPS and SVP, especially regarding the claim that
the GPS-GLP split in 2004 was based on deep-rooted ideological dierences while
the SVP-BDP split in 2008 occurred due to disagreement regarding questions of
political conduct among party elites. In 2003, the GPS displayed ve clusters in
the SSC paradigm. The largest cluster is represented by 8 elected candidates, and
two additional candidates emerge from the cluster with the closest network dis-
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tance from the largest cluster. The second-largest cluster, however, not only has
the largest network distance from the main cluster but also contains the elected
MP Martin Baumle, who was the driving force behind the breakup of the Green
Party in 2004. The network analysis, thus, reveals that a signicant portion of the
party candidates had dierent opinions than the elite but was represented by only
one person at the elite level. This explains the large dierences in Cc and Cf for
the party candidates versus the elected candidates in Figure 3.
a)
b)
8 2
Bäumle
2
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Gadient
Grunder
Haller
Hassler
Luginbühl
+ 20
24
Fig. 4. Network topology for the GPS in 2003 and the SVP in 2007 (at NT steps = 220), indicating
the distribution of elected candidates (numbers in clusters indicate how many elected candidates
are in the cluster) and the location of `schisma-exponents' (the area of each cluster scales with the
number of party members who belong to this cluster).
For the SVP, the situation is dierent: in 2007, the network topology is similar
to that of the GPS but, in quantitative terms, the network distances between the
large clusters are much smaller. Furthermore, all ve elected candidates who left the
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party during the split of 2008 were part of the main cluster; i.e., they did not dier
signicantly from the ideological core of the party. This indicates that the SVP
indeed experienced a dierent type of party split than the Green Party: While, in
the latter case, the defecting elite members showed a distinct belief system, the
party split in the former case cannot be explained by incompatible belief systems.
4.2.4. Comparing with alternative measures
Our plausibility analysis using our coherence measure detects the later split of
GPS and SVP and puts the notion of `bottom-up' and `top-down' party splits in
a quantied framework. This raises the question whether existing measures are
also able to serve this purpose. Of particular interest are measures emerging from
polarization research, as for example Esteban and Ray characterize polarization
with three features { 1) there must be a high degree of homogeneity within each
group; 2) there must be a high degree of heterogeneity across groups, and 3) there
must be a small number of signicantly sized groups ([20]: p. 824) { that have a
close connection to our understanding of coherence. In particular, this denition
matches with our characterization of the `schism zone' in our coherence diagram,
where indeed high polarization can be expected.
Polarization research oers various measures [21]. One family of measures at-
tempts to describe polarization as separation/clustering over distributions with ar-
bitrary numbers of groupings { the most prominent example of such a measure has
been presented by Esteban and Ray (ER polarization measure, [20]). A second set
of measures treats polarization as fundamentally a two-group phenomenon. A third
approach, that does not necessarily require predened groups, involves measures
(or their combinations) that assess, e.g., the dispersion (measured by variance) or
the bimodality (measured by kurtosis) of the belief distribution (e.g., [17]). Usually,
those measures are applied to analyze polarization among pre-established groups
(e.g., rich vs. poor, inter-party polarization; [49]) and they do this in referring to
only one measurement dimension (e.g., income or position along the political left-
right dimension). This leads to specic challenges when those measures are applied
to intra-party polarization, where sub-groups are fuzzy, not necessarily known a
priori, and characterized by a multitude of dimensions. In the following, we will ap-
ply selected polarization measures to our data set. When a measure reveals a high
polarization value for a specic party compared to other parties, we consider this
as an indication that the party may be polarized (and thus be in risk of splitting),
and when a party shows a signicant drop in polarization from 2003 to 2007, this
may indicate a party split (i.e., a drop-out of polarizing opinions and potentially
members that hold this opinion).
A rst approach (method A in Table 2) is to identify single issues that show clear
polarization among the party members. In our data set, agreement or disagreement
to specied issues is measured using a 4-point Likert-scale. Following the suggestion
of Di Maggio et al. [17], a negative kurtosis of the distribution along the agreement-
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Table 2. Comparison of alternative measures for intra-party polarization with our coherence measure.
Method Result per party Suggestions
CVP FDP GPS SPS SVP
2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 split in risk stable
A 30 13 14 17 3 2 3 2 17 16 CVP FDP GPS
Trend -7 3 -1 -1 -1 SVP SPS
B (K) -.565 .008 .198 .353 .889 .456 2.04 1.38 1.25 .377 CVP (SVP) FDP
B (V) .177 .156 .160 .161 .140 .121 .127 .121 .067 .114 (GPS)
Trend .573/-.021 .155/.001 -.433/-.019 -.651/-.006 -.877/.047 (SPS)
C (K) -.893 -.288 .321 -.534 4.73 1.51 2.44 1.46 1.44 1.38 CVP FDP GPS
C (V) .075 .019 .028 .035 .025 .019 .016 .031 .045 .021 SVP
Trend .605/-.056 -.855/.007 -3.22/-.006 -.979/.015 -.059/-.024 (SPS)
D .052 .025 .007 .015 .085 .041 .064 .073 .057 .088 GPS SVP FDP
Trend -.027 .008 -.044 .009 .031 SPS (CVP)
E .722 .777 .798 .884 .942 .932 .903 .926 .815 .853 (FDP) (CVP) SPS
Trend .055 .086 -.010 .023 .038 GPS
SVP
Coherence Analysis GPS SVPa CVP
(overall party coherence and comparing candidates with elected MPs) SVPb CVP
SPS
Real world GPS SVP CVP
(the SVP did split shortly after the 2007 elections) FDP
SPS
Note: Method A: Single issue polarization measured by the number of polarizing issues per party. Method B: left-
right polarization measured by the kurtosis (K) and variance (V) of the distribution. Method C: Polarization in
opinion space measured by the kurtosis (K) ad variance (V) of the distance distribution. Method D: Polarization of
pre-dened sub-groups using the Esteban-Ray polarization measure (the measure involves a parameter  that can
be interpreted as the polarization sensitivity of the measure. We used several settings for ; the results did not dier
qualitatively. Here we display the result for  = 1). Method E: Agreement index in legislative votes, own calculations
of data provided by the Swiss Parliamentary Services. `Trend' indicates the dierence of the measures for 2007 and
2003. If a suggestion is arguable for a specic party, the party name is in brackets.
asuggestion according to elected MP analysis. bsuggestion according to overall party coherence.
disagreement dimensions per issue can indicate polarization.q A straightforward
polarization measure is then to count the number of issues with bimodal distribution
and negative kurtosis per party. The results (Table 2, rst row) reveal that in CVP,
FDP and SVP a much higher number of polarizing issues is discernible compared
to GPS and SPS, whereas CVP was able to signicantly reduce this number. This
would suggest that CVP may have undergone a split, and that FDP and SVP are
in risk of splitting.
qA maximal bimodal distribution has a kurtosis of -2; a normal distribution has a kurtosis of
0. However, a negative kurtosis alone is not a sucient condition for bipolarity, as at distribu-
tions have a negative kurtosis, too. Bimodality of the distribution has therefore to be checked
independently.
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A second approach (method B) is to analyze data aggregated to represent the
left-right dimension { a common approach in party polarization research (e.g. [49]).
Also Swiss politics can be arranged along the political left-right axis [3, 31] and
political positions in Switzerland can be reduced to a one-dimensional representation
of the political space. We applied the correspondence analysis (CA) technique [48]r
to extract the coordinates of the candidates along the left-right axis. This measure
does not reveal clearly identiable groups within the party (which is not surprising),
although the distributions dier. To assess polarization, we use the combination of
dispersion and kurtosis (partly following the suggestion of Di Maggio et al. [17]).
Parties with more negative kurtosis and higher dispersion compared to others would
then be more polarized. The results (Table 2, second row) reveal that CVP is most
likely to have experienced a split. SVP, SPS and, to a lesser extent, GPS show a
reduction in kurtosis when comparing 2003 with 2007 { but the kurtosis is still
positive. Combined with the dispersion measure, only for the SVP a signicant
increase is detectable, which may indicate a risk for a split for the SVP.
A third approach (method C) is to investigate the distribution of the party-
member distances, i.e. the same input our algorithm uses. This data reects the
distribution of the party within the opinion space { and sub-structures within the
party should show up in a bimodal (or multi-modal) distance distribution, as several
scales should be present. Following the same rational as above, the results (Table
2, third row) reveal that CVP is most likely to have experienced a split and FDP
is most likely to be in risk of splitting.
A fourth approach (method D) is to identify sub-groups within each party and
then to apply the uni-dimensional Esteban-Ray polarization measure. Given our
data, this approach thus requires two preparatory steps: group identication and
dimension-reduction. As we compare this measure with our approach, we use the
same groups (identied at NT steps = 220) and we aggregate the data in order to
represent the left-right-dimension as outlined above. The mean position on the left-
right dimension per group is the common policy position of this group. Using this
measure reveals the following result (Table 2, fourth row): The highest polarizations
are detectable for SVP, GPS and SPS, whereas a signicant drop from 2003 to 2007
is discernible for GPS. This measure thus suggests that GPS most likely experienced
a split, and that SVP and SPS are in risk of splitting.
Finally (method E), following the earlier suggestions of relating party unity to
voting behavior of party members in parliament (see Introduction), we compare
our result with party unity scores in the legislative years 2003 and 2007 using the
Agreement Index developed by Ref. [29] (1 = voting in unison, 0 = votes evenly
split). The reported scores in Table 2 (see also similar results in Refs. [39, 60, 62])
reveal that those parties that actually split display high internal unity.
rCA is based on two analytical steps: 1) calculation of weighted Euclidean distance (chi-square
distance) between the answer proles of the candidates; 2) dimension reduction (factorization)
using singular value decomposition.
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In summary, we have shown that all alternatives failed to adequately describe
the actual development of the Swiss party system with respect to party splits. The
Esteban-Ray polarization measure provided the best approximation; however, it
wrongly identies also the SPS as a `split candidate'. Furthermore, it does not oer
any additional instrument to analyze further the dierent characters of the GPS
and SVP splits, as it does not include a perspective on the network of the parties.
Finally, it requires substantial preprocessing (group identication and dimension
reduction) in order to be applicable to the given data.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Based on recent progress in the theoretical and case study-based research on party
factionalism and the nding that the methodological tools to catch up with the
current state of theoretical research are still lacking, we introduced a novel mea-
sure of party coherence that expands the classic conceptions of party unity on two
dimensions and allows additional insights on how intra-party structures of belief
systems can aect the risk of a party split. This measure of party coherence is
inspired by a self-organization phenomenon in magnetic spin systems and adapts
the methodological concept of superparamagnetic clustering to political science. In
principle, the measure allows to include dierent potential mechanisms that may be
responsible for party splits, whereas these mechanisms are integrated in the measure
by choosing the type of similarity between party members considered as relevant.
For our analysis, we have chosen to focus on the similarity of political beliefs party
members have, as there is a rich tradition in political science that relates party
unity and factionalism to the political issues parties stand for.
Taking the example of the Swiss party system between 2003 and 2007, the
paper checked the validity and plausibility of the new measure's results against
the conventional wisdom of political observers. The results of our still preliminary
analysis are encouraging at least. They not only conform to the notion of Swiss
parties as generally non-unitary, federally organized entities, which is manifested
in the heterogeneous belief systems of party members, but they also conrm the
analytical potential of the measure of party coherence since we could disentangle
distinct types of party splits in a more precise manner: `bottom-up' splits driven by
divisions among the rank and le and `top-down' splits driven by divisions among
the party elites. Furthermore, the results of our analysis correctly located (according
to the view of political observers) the rank and le of the Green Party in 2003 as
well as the SVP party elites in 2003 and 2007 in the schism zone of the measure.
The purpose of the paper was to introduce a new measure of party coherence and
provide a preliminary check for the plausibility of its results. It did so by using the
data from a broad-based survey about the issue positions of candidates in the run-
up to the 2003 and 2007 general elections in Switzerland. The surveys of 2003 and
2007 are not completely equivalent. However, this is not decisive for the coherence
analysis, as it is not the survey data itself that is compared over time but the
December 31, 2012 14:12 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
ChristenOttSchwarz_Coherence_ACS
Paper's Title 21
inner coherence of the beliefs that the party members hold relative to each survey.
As the surveys for both years capture similar and a wide range of political topics
(although sometimes with dierent questions), the assumption that the comparison
of the coherence values between 2003 and 2007 is valid does not seem unreasonable.
But given the fact that this is the rst application of the measure to behavioral
data in social science there could and should be more emphasis put on the quality
of the analyzed data in future research.
Our analysis has included the comparison of our new measure with a number
of existing measures, mainly from the polarization literature. None of these exist-
ing measures detected the correct combination of party splits, split risks, and stable
parties. To our understanding, the main reason for their empirical inferiority results
from the fact that the theoretical concepts of polarization measures do not incorpo-
rate the notion of stability but (mis-)interpret internal diversity mostly as polariza-
tion. Furthermore, simple measures like kurtosis and variance that basically analyze
one-dimensional distributions are inappropriate for intra-party polarization, as the
dimension reduction blurs subtle but relevant structure in the data. The dierences
among groups within parties are much less clear compared to classical applica-
tions of polarization measures that cover the whole political spectrum. Applying
more sophisticated measures like the Esteban-Ray polarization measure therefore
require preprocessing of the data in order to both to identify relevant groups and
to reduce the dimensionality of the data set. Our approach, in contrary, uses the
multi-dimensionality as an asset, as the robust self-organization process of SPC in-
trinsically leads to enhancement of important dimensions while noisy/unimportant
dimensions are suppressed. In this way, group identication and coherence measure-
ment can be realized within the same framework.
There are a number of shortcomings in our approach (see also footnote l). The
main to consider is the legitimacy and validity of the similarity metrics chosen for
a coherence analysis. Regarding legitimacy, the similarity relation must be backed
both by theoretical insight and empirical support. Although, given the vast liter-
ature using political positions to analyze party unity questions, there is enough
reason to give political beliefs of party members an important role for party coher-
ence, they do not capture all relations between party members that may be decisive
for the party's internal structure. In particular, social behavior based on personal
relations, sensitivities, or animosities is not taken into account at all. In principle,
the methodology would allow integrating more aspects of similarity and { for ex-
ploratory purposes { analyzing their mutual contribution to the coherence result by
weighting them dierently. However, this would require solid data capturing this
similarity, which refers to a next pitfall of this methodology. As the similarity has
to be quantied, this quantication must itself be validated properly. In our case,
this issue is relevant as the political parties may be tempted to apply disciplinary
measures to ensure their candidates giving uniform answers to the smartvote ques-
tionnaire. Furthermore, our data relied solely on the candidates, i.e. neither internal
mechanisms of candidate selection nor the political beliefs of those not aspiring to
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candidateship are captured.
Besides the overcoming of the aforementioned shortcomings, we see three steps
for future research to the newly proposed measure: rst, subsets of the survey
questions (individual policy areas or ideological dimensions) could be analyzed to
get an idea of the policy-dependence of intra-party coherence. Second, as we have
seen that the investigation of legislative party unity on the basis of parliamentary
votes of elected MPs and the new measure of party coherence on the basis of pre-
election surveys among all candidates produce dierent results, the application of
the coherence analysis to legislative data would be instructive. Third, the measure of
party coherence could be utilized for a comparative analysis across party systems.
For the application of the coherence measure in an international comparison of
dierent party systems, the survey questions do not need to be identical. It would
suce to have available for each country a broad-based questionnaire that captures
the major issues and political dimensions of the respective countries and covers a
representative number of party candidates (or members) to produce new empirical
insights regarding the belief system-based intra-party structures.
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Appendix A. Superparamagnetic clustering
The superparamagnetic clustering algorithm [4] SPC was inspired by a self-
organization phenomenon in magnetic spin systems: in an inhomogeneous spin sys-
tem, clusters of correlated spins can emerge, corresponding to groups of spins with
strong couplings. Upon an increase in temperature, i.e. an increase in pressure on
the system, these clusters decay into smaller units in a cascade of (pseudo-)phase
transitions. For data clustering, we map a data set onto a spin system as follows:
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Each data item is represented by a Potts spin variable si with possible values in
f1; :::; qg. Each spin is coupled to its k nearest neighbors, where, for given distances
dij = dji between spins, the couplings are determined according to:
Jij = Jji =
1
k
exp
 
 d2ij
2a2
!
(A.1)
a is the average distance between neighbors. Each spin conguration s is asso-
ciated with the probability:
p(s) =
1
Z(T )
exp
 H(s)
T

(A.2)
with the Hamiltonian H(s) =
P
Jij(1   sisj ) and the normalization constant
Z(T ). The parameter T represents the system temperature. At a given T , clusters
are detected by means of the pair correlation Gij =
P
p(s)sisj , approximately
calculated by a Monte Carlo procedure. If Gij > , then si and sj belong to the
same cluster. This formalism reveals several parameters that must be dened in
a clustering procedure: the number of possible Potts spin values q, the number of
nearest neighbors k, and the threshold . The choice of these parameters is too
large to extend arbitrarily and does not inuence the results substantially if a data
set exhibits clear cluster structures [50]. Natural clusters, i.e., clusters with strong
homogeneous couplings, become manifest in their stability over a substantial range
of T . Hence, the T -stability provides a natural measure of cluster cohesion. This
fact is also exploited by the sequential superparamagnetic clustering algorithm SSC
(Ott et al. 2005). In this approach, the most stable cluster is extracted and it, as well
as the residual set, is reclustered. The procedure is repeated, providing a natural
binary tree with a cluster hierarchy. The couplings between spins and, hence, the
clustering results critically depend on the distances dij between the data points.
The choice of the distance function is guided by the type of problem that one wants
to solve and usually relies on the methodology of the scientic discipline in which
one operates. It need not necessarily fulll all axioms of a mathematical distance.
Using the framework of SPC and SSC for dening the coherence (with the
dimensions `cohesion' and `factionalism') of belief systems requires in the rst step
a denition of the data points and their mutual distance. For n data points, the
application of the distance measure leads to an n  n distance matrix that serves
as input for the clustering algorithm.
Appendix B. Sensitivity Analysis
The SPC and SCC clustering algorithms have been implemented by us in a platform-
independent tool (freeware)s. It goes along with a manual that describes the various
sThe tool is available at: http://stoop.ini.uzh.ch/research/clustering and http://www.ias.zhaw.ch/
de/science/ias/forschung/datenanalyse-statistik/sequential-clustering-software.html.
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parameters that can be dened when a specic clustering problem has to be solved.
Besides the aforementioned parameters k; q;, there are a couple of tool-dependent
parameters that allow for controlling the clustering resolution or clustering sensitiv-
ity in dierent ways. Generally, for high sensitivity, marginally stable (uctuating)
clusters can be detected and, as a consequence, the number of clusters increases.
However, marginally stable clusters are not robust against small changes in the
parameters. For data with no clear inherent structure, a sensitivity analysis, thus,
must be performed to identify the robustness of the results for changing parameter
conditions. In particular, one has to determine whether the system behaves (quasi)-
monotonously with respect to Cc and (in particular) Cf . Due to the stochastic
nature of the algorithm and the non-linear dependence of Cc and Cf on the cal-
ibration parameters, monotony is not guaranteed. For our data set, an extensive
exploration of the parameter space revealed that NT steps is the main parameter
that shows a quasi-monotonous behavior; i.e., there is an interval [a; b] where Cf is
0 for NT steps < a and Cf becomes very large for NT steps > b as the number of
clusters in the binary tree `explodes'.
